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WHAT WILL HAPPEN TO HONG KONG AFTER 2047?
DANNY GITTINGS*
I. INTRODUCTION
China guaranteed that Hong Kong would be allowed to follow a
different system from the rest of the country for fifty years from June
30, 1997, under the policy of "one country, two systems." June 30,
2047, marks the expiration date of this guarantee. As June 30, 2047,
approaches, more questions concerning what will happen to Hong
Kong are expected to emerge.'
Both the Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong (the
1984 bilateral treaty in which Britain and China agreed to the terms of
the 1997 handover), and the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special
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1. Under Article 1 of the 1982 Constitution of the People's Republic of China,
"[tihe socialist system is the basic system of the People's Republic of China."
XIANFA art. 1 (1982) (China) [hereinafter CHINA CONSTITUTION]. Hong Kong's two
foundational documents, the Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong and
Hong Kong's constitution and the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region, provide that Hong Kong's capitalist system "shall remain
unchanged for 50 years" from July 1, 1997. Joint Declaration of the Government of
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of
the People's Republic of China on the Question of Hong Kong (with Annexes),
U.K.-China, Annex I, § 1, Dec. 19, 1984, 1399 U.N.T.S. 33 [hereinafter Joint
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Administrative Region (the constitutional document which China's
legislature, the National People's Congress, subsequently enacted to
enshrine the promises in domestic legislation) reflect this "one
country, two systems" guarantee in almost identical terms.2 Both
documents also outline the basic policies of the guarantee in
considerable detail, with the later document (Hong Kong Basic Law)
explicitly stating its purpose-to "ensure the implementation of the
basic policies" in Hong Kong.3 The Basic Law of the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region stipulates that,"[t]he socialist system
and policies shall not be practised in the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region, and the previous capitalist system and way of
life shall remain unchanged for 50 years."4  This implements and
reinforces a provision in the Joint Declaration, which stipulates that
"the basic policies of the People's Republic of China regarding Hong
Kong .. . will remain unchanged for 50 years."5
Taken together, these documents provide a detailed description of
the "one country, two systems" policy currently practised in Hong
Kong. Under this policy, Hong Kong exists as a distinct entity from
the rest of China, known as a Special Administrative Region (SAR), 6
and has a high degree of autonomy;7 its own executive, legislative,
and independent judicial power;8 extensive guarantees of human
rights;9 and separate economic and financial systems.10 The Hong
Kong Basic Law purports to entrench these basic policies by
prohibiting any amendments to this constitutional document that
2. See Joint Declaration, supra note 1; HONG KONG BASIC LAW, supra note 1.
3. HONG KONG BASIC LAW, supra note 1, pmbl., para. 3.
4. HONG KONG BASIC LAW, supra note 1, art. 5.
5. Joint Declaration, supra note 1, para. 3(12).
6. Id. at para. 3(1); HONG KONG BASIC LAW, supra note 1, art. 5.
7. Joint Declaration, supra note 1, para. 3(2); HONG KONG BASIC LAW, supra
note 1, art. 2.
8. Joint Declaration, supra note 1, para. 3(3); HONG KONG BASIC LAW, supra
note 1, art. 2.
9. Joint Declaration, supra note 1, para. 3(5); HONG KONG BASIC LAW, supra
note 1, arts. 24-41.
10. Joint Declaration, supra note 1, para. 3(6)-(8); HONG KONG BASIC LAW,
supra note 1, arts. 106, 108-13.
2
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 42, No. 1 [2011], Art. 3
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol42/iss1/3
2011] WHAT WILL HAPPEN TO HONG KONG AFTER 2047? 39
would contravene the basic policies." Neither document, however,
addresses the issue of what will happen after the fifty-year period
expires, an issue that is starting to attract some concern in Hong Kong,
particularly in relation to the validity of property rights beyond that
date. 12
For some, the answer is simple. According to Kenneth Chan,
"'one country, two systems' should be seen as a transitory
arrangement with an expiry date-June 30, 2047."l3 According to this
view, the special treatment Hong Kong enjoys for those fifty years is a
temporary measure to ease the territory's reintegration back into
China. Once that process is complete, it will be unnecessary to treat
the city differently from any other part of the country. That argument
is put forward most emphatically by Robert Morris, who argues that
the Hong Kong Basic Law, "by its own terms[,] is to have a lifespan
of 50 years from 1997 to 2047."l4
Others adopt a more nuanced view. Johannes Chan notes the
ambiguity over what will happen to Hong Kong in the long-term: "[i]t
is unclear whether the ultimate goal is to retain two equally thriving
but different systems, or whether it is to assimilate Hong Kong into
11. HONG KONG BASIC LAW, supra note 1, art. 159(4), pmbl., para. 3 (stating
that the Basic Law itself represents and "ensure[s] the implementation of the basic
policies of the People's Republic of China regarding Hong Kong").
12. See Margaret Ng, The Land We Stand On, S. CHINA MORNING POST, June
1, 2007 ("Two recent incidents have raised concern. The first is land grants. Since
July 1997, the SAR Government has been making land grants of 50 years from the
date of the grant. As time goes on, more and more land grants extend beyond 2047.
But does the SAR Government have the power to make grants beyond 2047? In
legal language, what is the nature of the right granted for the period between 2047
and the expiry date of the grant?"). Margaret Ng is a barrister and the Hong Kong
legal profession's representative in the local legislature.
13. Kenneth Ka-Lok Chan, Taking Stock of "One Country, Two Systems," in
Yiu-chung Wong, "ONE COUNTRY, Two SYSTEMS" IN CRISIS 35, 54 (Yiu-chung
Wong, ed., 2004). Kenneth Chan is an Associate Professor of Political Science at
Hong Kong Baptist University.
14. See, e.g., Robert J. Morris, The "Replacement" Chief Executive's Two-
Year Term: A Pure and Unambiguous Common Law Analysis, 35 H.K. L.J. 17, 22,
24 (2005) (referring to "the 2047 end-date of the Basic Law itself"). Robert Morris
has a doctorate degree in Comparative and Chinese Law. Dr. Morris, who also has a
Juris Doctorate degree, has taught at the University of Hong Kong.
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the mainland politically, legally, culturally and ideologically."15
Chan's view also raises the question of whether the two systems will
even remain different in the long term, as the differences between the
capitalist system practised in Hong Kong and the socialist system as
now practised in China have already narrowed greatly in the quarter
century since China and Britain agreed on the "one country, two
systems" formula for Hong Kong in 1984.16 If this trend continues,
there may be even fewer differences between the two systems by the
time June 30, 2047, arrives.
As part of the "one country, two systems" formula, Hong Kong
has special privileges, including, but not limited to, its own Court of
Final Appeal with the power of final adjudication," and the authority
to issue its own separate currency.' 8 In the most optimistic scenario,
15. Johannes Chan, Civil Liberties, Rule ofLaw and Human Rights: The Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region in its First Four Years, in THE FIRST TUNG
CHEE-HWA ADMINISTRATION: THE FIRST FIVE YEARS OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL
ADMINISTRATIVE REGION 89, 116 (Lau Siu-kai ed., 2002). Johannes Chan is Dean
of the Faculty of Law of the University of Hong Kong, and he is an expert on Hong
Kong Constitutional Law.
16. For an example of how the differences between the two systems have
narrowed, see the changes made to the Constitution of the People's Republic of
China since 1984. When the parties agreed to the terms of Hong Kong's future in
1984, the 1982 version of the Constitution of the People's Republic of China
prohibited any form of private land use rights. Since then, Articles 10 and 13 of
China's constitution have been amended to both permit private land leases and
strengthen private property rights. Compare CHINA CONSTITUTION arts. 10, 13
(1982) with CHINA CONSTITUTION arts. 10 (amended 1988), 13 (amended 2004).
17. Joint Declaration, supra note 1, para. 3(3), Annex I, § 3; HONG KONG
BASIC LAW, supra note 1, arts. 19, 82.
18. Joint Declaration, supra note 1, para. 3(7); HONG KONG BASIC LAW, supra
note 1, art. 111. These are the types of special privileges that national governments
-whether socialist or capitalist-rarely grant to any region in any part of its
country, save under some kind of formula as exceptional as "one country, two
systems." For example, the International Committee of Lawyers for Tibet's study
on Forms for Autonomy, which examined 34 autonomous arrangements around the
globe, identified only three other examples of autonomous areas with their own
independent judiciary. See EVA HERZER, TIBET JUSTICE CTR., OPTIONS for TIBET'S
FUTURE POLITICAL STATUS: SELF-GOVERNANCE THOUGH [SIC] AN AUTONOMOUS
ARRANGEMENT 12 (1999), http://www.tibetjustice.org/reports/AutonomyBooklet.
pdf.
4
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 42, No. 1 [2011], Art. 3
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol42/iss1/3
2011] WHAT WILL HAPPEN TO HONG KONG AFTER 2047?
even if China has become a liberal democracy by June 30, 2047,
practising the rule of law and respect for human rights, the issue of the
future of Hong Kong's special privileges would remain. For the
pessimists such as Kenneth Chan, these special privileges will
automatically end together with all aspects of "one country, two
systems" after the fifty-year period expires on June 30, 2047.19 Other
scholars take a more optimistic view. Benny Tai, for example,
suggests "it is legally possible for the constitutional game of Hong
Kong to continue to operate under the Basic Law after 2047."20
This article asserts that Tai's statement correctly reflects the legal
position, and that change immediately after June 30, 2047, is far from
inevitable. In reaching this conclusion, this article first argues that
concerns about the validity of property rights (specifically,
government land leases) beyond June 30, 2047, are overstated.
Second, this article shows that, while further clarification may be
considered desirable, perhaps even vital, as June 30, 2047,
approaches, the existing provisions in the Hong Kong Basic Law
already permit the continuation of "one country, two systems" beyond
that date. Third, this article demonstrates that, while "one country,
two systems" has the potential to continue beyond June 30, 2047,
what will become possible after that date, if China so wishes, are
fundamental changes to how "one country, two systems" is applied in
Hong Kong. But, because the protections against China eroding "one
country, two systems" even before that date are far less watertight
than they appear at first sight, this article concludes that, even in this
respect, the significance of June 30, 2047, is overstated.
II. VALIDITY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS BEYOND 2047
Because almost all private land in Hong Kong is held on long-
term leases granted by the government, the government's authority to
19. See Chan, supra note 13.
20. Benny Y.T. Tai, Basic Law, Basic Politics: The Constitutional Game of
Hong Kong, 37 H.K. L.J. 503, 577 (2007). Benny Tai is an Associate Professor of
Law at the University of Hong Kong, and he is a prominent commentator on current
events in Hong Kong.
41
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pass on good title to land is critically important.21 This issue caused
particular problems for Britain during the final decades of its rule in
Hong Kong, because Britain itself held most parts of Hong Kong on a
ninety-nine-year lease from China that expired on June 30, 1997. 22
Although other solutions were canvassed, Britain ultimately
concluded that it lacked authority to grant any kind of land rights
beyond that date without some form of approval from China.23
Initial attempts to secure China's informal approval for Britain to
issue land leases extending beyond June 30, 1997, produced a hostile
response from China during a 1979 meeting between Hong Kong
Governor Lord Maclehose and Deng Xiaoping, China's paramount
leader.24  The uncertainty over the land lease issue then provided
much of the impetus for the formal negotiations between the two
countries about Hong Kong's future, and it ultimately culminated in
the signing of the Joint Declaration in 1984. The Joint Declaration,
21. For an excellent description of the system of government land leases in
Hong Kong since 1841, see Hong Kong Land Lease Reform, Part 1, WEBB-
SITE.COM (Oct. 7, 2010), http://www.webb-site.com/articles/leases l.asp.
Throughout Hong Kong's history, leases have varied in length from fifty years to
999 years, largely depending on when they were granted. The government granted
the longest leases during the 19th century, and it has granted shorter leases during
more recent decades.
22. Under the "Convention of Peking 1898," the governments of Great Britain
and China agreed to enlarge the limits of the British territory through a lease
agreement. The term of the lease was 99 years from July 1, 1898, the year the
Convention came into force. Convention Between Great Britain and China
Respecting an Extension of Hong Kong Territory, June 9, 1898, Gr. Brit.-China, 90
B.S.P. 17 [hereinafter Convention of Peking 1898]. This enlargement, referred to as
the New Territories, comprises over 90% of the land area of Hong Kong. ROBIN
MCLAREN, BRITAIN'S RECORD IN HONG KONG 2, 12 (1997).
23. See ROBERT COTTRELL, THE END OF HONG KONG: THE SECRET
DIPLOMACY OF IMPERIAL RETREAT 44-47 (1993). For a brief discussion on
alternative options Britain could have pursued, see PETER WESLEY-SMITH,
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN HONG KONG 59-61 (2d ed. 1994)
(arguing that Britain, pursuant to either the Foreign Jurisdiction Acts of 1890 and
1913 or the act of state doctrine, could have asserted legal authority beyond June 30,
1997).
24. For an excellent account of the parties' failure to resolve the issue at this
meeting, see COTTRELL, supra note 23, at 53-57, 61-62.
6
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 42, No. 1 [2011], Art. 3
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol42/iss1/3
2011] WHAT WILL HAPPEN TO HONG KONG AFTER 2047?
which includes an annex entirely devoted to resolving the land
leaseissue,25 gave Britain the legal authority to issue and renew land
leases that extend beyond June 30, 1997-provided that their
expiration date was no later than June 30, 2047.26
Based on the historical importance of land lease issues, it is no
surprise that, thus far, much of the discussion about what will happen
to Hong Kong after June 30, 2047, has once again focussed on the
land lease issue.27  The land lease issue is especially troubling
because, ever since Britain's departure on June 30, 1997, the Hong
Kong SAR Government, which has administered the territory since
July 1, 1997, has not considered it necessary to apply a June 30, 2047
expiration date to the issuance and renewal of land leases. 28 Instead,
most land leases are now issued or renewed for a period of fifty years,
which means a large number of leases extend beyond June 30, 2047.29
For example, the lease for the land used to construct the Hong Kong
Disneyland theme park includes a right to renew the lease for a second
25. Joint Declaration, supra note 1, Annex III.
26. See id at Annex III, paras. 2-3. Under paragraph four, the grant of new
land leases was subject to a fifty hectare annual limit. This limit, however, could be
increased if the Land Commission consented. Id. at Annex III, paras. 4, 7(c).
27. Alice Lee, Leases Beyond 2047?, 1998 L. LECTURES FOR PRAC., 177
(H.K.) 183-86. Alice Lee is an Associate Professor of Law at the University of
Hong Kong who specializes in Hong Kong Land Law. See also Margaret Ng, supra
note 12.
28. THE Gov. OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION,
HOUSING, PLANNING AND LANDS BUREAU, CB(1)503/06-07(01), PERMANENT
SECRETARY FOR HOUSING, PLANNING AND LANDS' REPLY TO THE HON. ALAN
LEONG'S QUESTION ABOUT GOVERNMENT'S PROPOSAL OF GRANTING A 50-YEAR
LEASE FOR THE OPERATION OF THE CRUISE TERMINAL (Dec. 12, 2006) [hereinafter
GRANTING A 50-YEAR LEASE], available at http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr06-
07/english/panels/plw/papers/plwl114cbl-503-1-e.pdf. See also HONG KONG
SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION GOVERNMENT INFORMATION SERVICES DAILY
INFORMATION BULLETIN, HKSARG LAND POLICY AND FIRST LAND DISPOSAL
PROGRAMME ANNOUNCED (July 15, 1997), available at http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/
general/dib/0715.htm.
29. For the Hong Kong SAR Government's justification of this practise, see
GRANTING A 50-YEAR LEASE, supra note 28.
43
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fifty-year period, a right which, if exercised, would allow this lease to
continue until 2100.30
Some have expressed doubts and concerns about the legality of
this practise and its broader implications for landowners. For
example, citing the fifty-year limit in the Joint Declaration and the
Hong Kong Basic Law on the guarantees against fundamental
changes, Margaret Ng has questioned: "[h]ow is it possible for the
SAR Government to grant a lease beyond 2047? What are the rights
and interests of the 'owner' of the lease?" 31 Alice Lee also warns, "it
does not take long for developers and property owners to realise that
the validity of government leases is not absolutely certain." 32
Given the historical background outlined above, such concerns are
perhaps understandable. But, they overlook some very important
differences between the land lease problems that arose during the final
decades of British rule and the situation that exists in Hong Kong
today. Prior to July 1, 1997, land leases were issued under the
authority of British rule, which was itself subject to a June 30, 1997
time limit on the lease it had over most parts of Hong Kong.33 Now,
however, there is no equivalent time limit because Hong Kong has
reverted to Chinese sovereignty, and all land and natural resources in
the territory belong to the Chinese state in perpetuity. 34
The power to manage, use, and develop that land-including
granting land leases-is currently delegated to the Hong Kong SAR
Government by the Chinese state. 35 But, even in the most extreme
scenario of Hong Kong being abolished as a separate entity after June
30, 2047, and the simultaneous disappearance of the Hong Kong SAR
Government that granted those leases, the rights granted under those
30. See Press Release, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
Government, Land Lease Term for Disneyland Project (Nov. 4, 1999), available at
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/199911/04/1104149.htm.
31. Ng, supra note 12.
32. Lee, supra note 27, at 184.
33. MCLAREN, supra note 22, at 12; Convention of Peking 1898, supra note
22.
34. See HONG KONG BASIC LAW, supra note 1, art. 7.
35. Id.
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land leases need not necessarily disappear. According to Albert Chen,
the Chair Professor in Constitutional Law at the University of Hong
Kong and a member of the Committee for the Basic Law,36
responsibility for any unexpired portion of those land leases would
simply pass to the body that authorized the Hong Kong SAR
Government to issue the leases, namely the Chinese central
government.37
Though some might justifiably object to transferring
responsibility for land leases granted by Hong Kong authorities to the
more uncertain hands of Chinese national authorities,38 this potential
outcome is no longer unthinkable in the way it was the last time fears
arose over the future of land leases (during British rule in the early
1980s), a time when the Chinese constitution still prohibited any form
of land leases. 39  Now, by contrast, private property rights are
explicitly protected under the Chinese constitution,40 and there is a
36. Established by a Decision of the National People's Congress in 1990, the
Committee for the Basic Law is comprised of Chinese and Hong Kong experts.
Decision of the National People's Congress Approving the Proposal by the Drafting
Committee for the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region on the Establishment
of the Committee for the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region Under the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress Basic
Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Apr. 4, 1990,
effective Apr. 4, 1990) P.R.C. Laws (China). China consults with the Committee on
issues relating to implementation of the Hong Kong Basic Law. See HONG KONG
BASIC LAW, supra note 1, arts. 17(3), 18(3), 158(4), 159(3).
37. Backchat: Interview by Danny Gittings and Hugh Chiverton with Albert
Chen, Martin Lee, and Joseph Cheng (Radio Television Hong Kong Channel 3
broadcast Dec. 8, 2009) [hereinafter Backchat] at 14:00-14:30 (transcript and audio
on file with California Western International Law Journal), a radio panel discussion
on the legal implications of 2047.
38. For an excellent description of the legal uncertainties which surround the
granting of land leases in China (where they are known as land use rights), see
PITMAN B. POTTER, THE CHINESE LEGAL SYSTEM: GLOBALIZATION AND LOCAL
LEGAL CULTURE 69 (2001).
39. See CHINA CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, art. 10 (1982). Article 10 was
eventually amended in 1988 to remove the constitutional prohibition. Article 10
now states, "[t]he right to the use of land may be transferred according to law."
CHINA CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, art. 10 (amended 1988).
40. CHINA CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, art. 13 (amended 2004).
45
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long-established legal framework for granting land leases in other
parts of China.41
In addition to the overstated concerns about the validity of
property rights beyond June 30, 2047, it cannot be argued that the
Hong Kong SAR Government has exceeded its legal authority in
issuing land leases that extend beyond June 30, 2047. Article 123 of
the Hong Kong Basic Law, which grants the Hong Kong SAR
Government broad authority to renew land leases "in accordance with
laws and policies formulated by the Region on its own," makes no
mention of a June 30, 2047 time limit.42 This omission is particularly
significant because an otherwise similar provision in Article 121 of
the Hong Kong Basic Law, which covers the renewal of land leases in
Hong Kong by British authorities before July 1, 1997, does set a June
30, 2047 time limit on any land leases renewed while Hong Kong was
still under British rule. 43
In defending its practise of issuing and renewing land leases
beyond June 30, 2047, the Hong Kong SAR Government has argued,
"[i]t also seems illogical to assume that the SAR government could
only grant leases for an excessively short period as we approach 30
June 2047."44 Wang Shuwen, a prominent Chinese legal scholar who
played an important role in the drafting of the Hong Kong Basic Law,
has put it more bluntly. Pointing to the differences in wording
between Articles 121 and 123 of the Hong Kong Basic Law, Wang
has dismissed as "groundless and unreasonable" any concern that the
41. For an excellent account of the development of this legal framework, see
JIANFU CHEN, CHINESE LAW: CONTEXT AND TRANSFORMATION 372-89 (2008)
(discussing the history and evolution of the system of property rights in the context
of Chinese law and exploring the evolution of property rights laws from the General
Principles of Civil Law in the 1980s to the drafting of the 2007 Law on Rights in
rem, which is also known as the 2007 Property/Property Rights Law).
42. HONG KONG BASIC LAW, supra note 1, art. 123. See also CK Lau, Why
2047 Matters Even Now, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 18, 1997.
43. WANG SHUWEN ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO THE BASIC LAW OF THE HONG
KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION 614-15 (Wang Shuwen, et al., eds., Jiang
Guihua et al., trans., China Law Press English ed. 2000); compare HONG KONG
BASIC LAW, supra note 1, art. 121 with HONG KONG BASIC LAW, supra note 1, art.
123.
44. GRANTING A 50-YEAR LEASE, supra note 28, para. 2.
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Hong Kong SAR Government lacks the legal authority to issue land
leases extending beyond June 30, 2047.45
III. "UNCHANGED FOR 50 YEARS"
Apart from the specific provisions regarding the renewal of land
leases while Hong Kong was still under British rule, the international
agreements and constitutional documents regarding Hong Kong's
future do not explicitly mention the June 30, 2047 date. Because the
parties' primary focus at that time was to provide reassurance about
continuity beyond 1997, the date's omission is not necessarily
surprising. Moreover, with considerable doubts about whether Hong
Kong would even survive as a separate entity beyond June 30, 1997,46
most people seemed to pay little attention to what would happen half a
century beyond that.4 7
In the absence of any further direct references to June 30, 2047, in
either the Joint Declaration or the Hong Kong Basic Law, the
significance of this date must instead be inferred from the provisions
in both documents that prohibit fundamental change for a period of
fifty years beyond June 30, 1997. As already noted, Article 5 of the
Hong Kong Basic Law states: "[t]he socialist system and policies shall
not be practised in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, and
the previous capitalist system and way of life shall remain unchanged
for 50 years." It is this provision, which repeats identical wording
used in the Joint Declaration, 4 8 that is cited by those who believe that
"one country, two systems" will automatically come to an end on June
30, 2047, and that the socialist system (if it still exists in the rest of
China at that date) will be applied to Hong Kong after that date.
Morris, for instance, argues: "[t]he destination is indeed 'to assimilate
Hong Kong into the mainland politically, legally, culturally and
45. SHUWEN, supra note 43, at 614-15.
46. See, e.g., David J. Clark, The Basic Law: One Document, Two Systems, in
THE HONG KONG BASIC LAW: BLUEPRINT FOR "STABILITY AND PROSPERITY"
UNDER CHINESE SOVEREIGNTY? 38-39 (Ming K. Chan & David J. Clark eds., 1991).
47. For one of the earliest discussions of this issue, see CK Lau, supra note 42.
48. Joint Declaration, supra note 1, Annex I, § 1.
47
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ideologically,' using force if necessary, at whatever place may exist
there in 2047."49
However, it is open to question whether this is the correct
interpretation of Article 5. Note, in particular, the comma separating
Article 5 into two separate clauses in the English text of the Hong
Kong Basic Law. The second clause, guaranteeing that the "previous
capitalist system and way of life shall remain unchanged," is expressly
limited to a specific time period of fifty years. But the first clause,
guaranteeing that "the socialist system and policies shall not be
practised in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region" is not
expressly stated in this way, and it does not appear to be subject to a
specific time limitation.
This structural arrangement is significant because the guarantees
in these two clauses separated by a comma in Article 5, although
closely related, are not necessarily identical. While the guarantee in
the second clause (that the socialist system and policies will not be
practised in Hong Kong) is an essential precondition for the
implementation of the guarantee in the first clause (that Hong Kong's
previous capitalist system and way of life will be maintained), the
same is not true in reverse. After all, it would be perfectly possible to
make many changes to Hong Kong's previous capitalist system and
way of life that stopped short of introducing a socialist system, and
still maintained "one country, two systems" in some shape or form.
The Chinese text of the Hong Kong Basic Law, which prevails in
the event of any discrepancy between the two texts,o is more
ambiguous on this point.5 ' In the Chinese text of Article 5, a
reference to "no change for 50 years" is further separated from the
49. Robert J. Morris, Forcing the Dance: Interpreting the Hong Kong Basic
Law Dialectically, in INTERPRETING HONG KONG'S BASIC LAW: THE STRUGGLE FOR
COHERENCE 97, 100 (Hualing Fu et al. eds., 2007).
50. Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on
the English Text of the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
of the People's Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'1
People's Cong., June 28, 1990), translated in P.R.C. Laws 1990-1992.
51. The Chinese text of Article 5 states as follows:
), . HONGKONG BASIC LAW, supra note 1, art. 5.
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statement that "the previous capitalist system and way of life shall
remain unchanged" by a comma, making it unclear precisely what the
reference to fifty years means.
In the absence of a clear conflict between the two texts, it is
submitted that the position stated in the English text prevails, under
which the guarantee that "the socialist system will not be practised in
Hong Kong" is not expressly qualified by the fifty-year time period
mentioned in the second clause of Article 5. Both the English and
Chinese texts of the Preamble of the Hong Kong Basic Law reinforce
this interpretation, as both declare, without reference to any specific
time period, "that under the principle of 'one country, two systems',
the socialist system and policies will not be practised in Hong
Kong." 52
In addition to the language and structure of the Hong Kong Basic
Law permitting the continuation of "one country, two systems,"
Chinese leaders have never suggested that they intend to impose a
socialist system on Hong Kong after June 30, 2047. In fact, Deng
Xiaoping, China's leader during the signing of the Joint Declaration
and drafting of the Hong Kong Basic Law, has repeatedly suggested
that "one country, two systems" would remain in force beyond that
date. In 1988, for instance, Deng Xiaoping told an international
conference: "[a]s a matter of fact, 50 years is only a vivid way of
putting it. Even after 50 years our policy will not change either. That
is, for the first 50 years it cannot be changed and for the second there
will be no need to change it." 54 Some Chinese officials have even
suggested that China originally intended the guarantees about the
maintenance of Hong Kong's previous capitalist system and way of
life to apply indefinitely.55 According to these accounts, it was only
because of suggestions from Hong Kong that guarantees linked to a
52. HONG KONG BASIC LAW, supra note 1, pmbl. para. 2.
53. DENG XIAOPING, ON THE QUESTION OF HONG KONG 47, 61 (1993)
(providing two instances where Deng Xiaoping has provided reassurance about the
continuation of the "one country, two systems" policy beyond 2047).
54. Id. at 61.
55. CK Lau, supra note 42 (citing Wong Man-fong, a senior Chinese official
involved in formulating policy on Hong Kong).
49
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specific time period would carry more credibility that these guarantees
were subsequently framed in terms of a fifty-year period.56
Viewed in this context, it seems unlikely that Article 5 of the
Hong Kong Basic Law was ever intended to provide for an automatic
end to "one country, two systems" and the imposition of a socialist
system in Hong Kong after June 30, 2047. Instead, the reference to
fifty years in the second clause of Article 5 should be read as referring
only to the minimum period during which the guarantee against
making any fundamental changes to Hong Kong's capitalist system
and way of life applies. But, even this conclusion about the limited
duration of Article 5's guarantee against change is not free from
challenge, as it is possible to argue that other provisions in the Hong
Kong Basic Law prevent any fundamental changes even after June 30,
2047.
Extensive efforts have been made to entrench large parts of the
Hong Kong Basic Law. Yash Ghai notes that this statute is, in some
respects, more difficult to amend than China's national constitution,57
primarily because Article 159(4) purports to prohibit any amendment
that would "contravene the established basic policies of the People's
Republic of China regarding Hong Kong."58 As already noted, these
basic policies, originally stipulated in the Joint Declaration, cover
everything from guarantees of human rights to Hong Kong's separate
financial, economic, and legal systems.59 In short, these policies cover
almost anything that people worry China might attempt to take away
from Hong Kong after June 30, 2047.
On one reading of the Hong Kong Basic Law, Article 159(4)
appears to protect against any such changes even after June 30, 2047,
because its prohibition on any amendments that would contravene
these basic policies contains no expiration date, and arguably
56. Id. (citing Wong Man-fong).
57. See Yash Ghai, The Legal Foundations of Hong Kong's Autonomy:
Building on Sand, 29 ASIA PAC. J. PUB. ADMIN. 3, 7 (2007). Yash Ghai is an expert
on Hong Kong Constitutional Law. Until his retirement in 2005, he was the Sir
Y.K. Pao Professor of Public Law at the University of Hong Kong.
58. HONG KONG BASIC LAW, supra note 1, art. 159(4).
59. See supra notes 6-10.
14
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 42, No. 1 [2011], Art. 3
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol42/iss1/3
WHAT WILL HAPPEN TO HONG KONG AFTER 2047?
continues to apply indefinitely. This, however, is probably too literal
an interpretation of the wording of Article 159(4). Because the
original guarantee in the Joint Declaration only stated that these basic
policies would remain unchanged for the first fifty years after July 1,
1997,60 Ghai persuasively argues that under a purposive interpretation
of the Hong Kong Basic Law, the restriction on amendments imposed
by Article 159(4) should be read as only applying for the same fifty-
year period.61 Under this interpretation, while "one country, two
systems" can continue to exist after June 30, 2047, under the Hong
Kong Basic Law, fundamental changes to how that policy is applied in
practise will become possible, which are not, at least in theory,
permissible before that date.
IV. So, WHAT WILL HAPPEN TO HONG KONG AFTER 2047?
Thus far, this article's conclusion has been that much of the fears
about what will happen after 2047-especially in relation to property
rights-are misplaced, and nothing. in the Hong Kong Basic Law
automatically provides for the imposition of a socialist system in
Hong Kong after that date. However, it should be acknowledged that
once a literal interpretation of Article 159(4) is rejected-an
interpretation which might have afforded Hong Kong some degree of
protection beyond June 30, 2047-fundamental changes do become
permissible under the Hong Kong Basic Law after that date.
Moreover, there are many possible ways to amend the Hong Kong
Basic Law (such as removing provisions protecting human rights or
eroding the power of the judiciary) that, while still falling far short of
imposing a socialist system, would so severely erode Hong Kong's
separate system as to make it seem virtually meaningless.
Concern that such fundamental changes will be implemented in
Hong Kong immediately after June 30, 2047, even if this runs counter
to Deng Xiaoping's public statements on the subject, can only be
60. Joint Declaration, supra note 1, para. 3(12).
61. YASH GHAI, HONG KONG'S NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER: THE
RESUMPTION OF CHINESE SOVEREIGNTY AND THE BASIC LAW 143 (2d ed. 1999).
2011] 51
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expected to increase as that date draws closer. 62 Pressure for China to
provide more formal clarification that it will not implement such
changes can also be expected to increase.
Thus far, the dialogue on how China could most effectively
provide such clarification has focussed on amending the Hong Kong
Basic Law. For example, to remove any possible doubt about the
meaning of Article 5, Lee proposes adding a clause explicitly
guaranteeing that the Hong Kong SAR's capitalist system and way of
life will continue beyond June 30, 2047.63 Chen suggests that the
outdated provisions in the Hong Kong Basic Law could also be
amended.64
Given the exhaustive nature of the Hong Kong Basic Law, Chen's
argument is somewhat attractive. Consisting of 160 articles and three
annexes, running to a total of more than 12,000 words, the Hong Kong
Basic Law goes into much greater detail than is usual among
constitutional documents. 65  While the document's comprehensive
format helped provide reassurance about Hong Kong's future, it also
resulted in the drafters including provisions that have already led to
practical problems, as China has experienced some dramatic social
and economic changes since the Hong Kong Basic Law was drafted in
the 1980s. 66
For instance, due to generous provisions in the Hong Kong Basic
Law, Hong Kong's medical services related to childbirth are now
62. Gary Cheung, Experts Pinpoint Further Uncertainties Over Law
Amendments 'Could End Doubts on Financing and Rights,' S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Apr. 14, 2005, 2005 WLNR 5849170 (quoting Priscilla Leung Mei-fun,
former Deputy Dean of City University's School of Law, "[s]ome mainland legal
experts have suggested that some people in Hong Kong may be hesitant to buy flats
in the 2020s or 2030s because they are worried about what will happen after the 50-
year lifespan of the 'one country, two systems' formula expires in 2047").
63. Lee, supra note 27, at 185.
64. See Backchat, supra note 37, at 20:20-20:50.
65. For example, the Hong Kong Basic Law is almost three times longer than
the U.S. Constitution, which consists of only 4,400 words. Compare HONG KONG
BASIC LAW with U.S. CONST.
66. Social and economic changes discussed infra notes 67-72 and
accompanying text.
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stretched to their limit. Each year, Hong Kong receives an influx of
tens of thousands of mainland Chinese mothers, who are often
accused of crowding Hong Kong mothers out of local hospitals. 67
One of the main reasons why so many mainland Chinese mothers
choose to give birth in Hong Kong is to take advantage of generous
provisions in the Hong Kong Basic Law granting permanent residency
rights to all Chinese children born in Hong Kong, even if their parents
are not local residents. 68 It is a problem that no one seems to have
foreseen when the Hong Kong Basic Law was written in the 1980s, a
time when travel in China was still heavily restricted and very few
mainland Chinese women were able to travel to Hong Kong to give
birth. Now, by contrast, it has become a serious social problem in
Hong Kong that has led to protests by local mothers, and can only be
fundamentally addressed by changing the relevant provision in the
Hong Kong Basic Law.6 9
Chen also cites another provision in the Hong Kong Basic Law
which he believes to be outdated-the provision that guarantees the
continued existence of the Hong Kong dollar as a separate currency.70
In the 1980s, at the time the Hong Kong Basic Law was written, the
Chinese economy was much weaker and less open than it is today.7'
67. Dennis Chong, Birth Pains, THE STANDARD (Apr. 15, 2011),
http://www.thestandard.com/hk/newsdetails.asp?pp cat-36&art-id= 110208&sid=
32037222&con_type=3&d str-20110415&sear year--201 1.
68. See HONG KONG BASIC LAW, supra note 1, art. 24(2)(1).
69. See Dennis Chong, supra note 67 (discussing the social and economic
implications surrounding the high number of Chinese women giving birth in Hong
Kong). The Hong Kong Government tried to address the problem by amending
domestic legislation to limit permanent residency rights to cases where at least one
of the child's parents has residency rights. Immigration (Amendment) (No. 2)
Ordinance, No. 31 (1997) (which established different criteria for permanent
resident status). However, the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal subsequently
invalidated a portion of the amendment, as it was inconsistent with the wording of
Article 24(2)(1) of the Hong Kong Basic Law. Director of Immigration v. Chong
Fung Yuen (2001) 4 H.K.C.F.A.R. 211 (C.F.A.).
70. HONG KONG BASIC LAW, supra note 1, art. 111; Backchat, supra note 37,
at 36:55-37:25.
71. See Nicholas R. Lardy, China's Economy: Problems and Prospects, 12
NEWSL. FOREIGN POL'Y RES. INST'S WACHMAN CENTER 4 (2007); Backchat, supra
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Due to the weak state of the Chinese economy, guaranteeing the
continued existence of the Hong Kong dollar as a separate currency
seemed vital to Hong Kong's survival as an international financial
centre. Now, by contrast, with the Chinese Renminbi appreciating
against other international currencies and already widely circulating in
Hong Kong,72 it is another provision that may arguably be considered
outdated by the time 2047 arrives.73
Based on the analysis above, June 30, 2047, should be seen as an
opportunity rather than a threat, as it provides Hong Kong with an
opportunity to rid itself of any shackles imposed by any outdated
provisions in the Hong Kong Basic Law, while preserving the bulk of
the provisions in the Hong Kong Basic Law that protect the "one
country, two systems" concept.
To reach a consensus on which provisions in the Hong Kong
Basic Law should be retained and which ones should be changed,
some kind of consultation process, or perhaps even a constitutional
convention in Hong Kong prior to 2047 would be required. Such a
consultation process could be modelled after the original process of
writing the Hong Kong Basic Law during the 1980s, which involved
the publication of two initial drafts and extensive public consultation
in Hong Kong. 74
note 37, at 22:15-23:00.
72. Mark Konyn, All Eyes on Renminbi in Hong Kong, FINANCIAL TIMES,
(Aug. 1, 2010), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/21ad4b98-9cO2-11df-a7a400144feab
49a.html#axzz 1 Qhillllo.
73. Backchat, supra note 37, at 36:55-37:30.
74. The Drafting Committee for the Basic Law issued the first draft "for
solicitation of opinions" in April 1988. DRAFTING COMMITTEE FOR THE BASIC LAW,
THE DRAFT BASIC LAW OF THE HONK KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION OF
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (FOR SOLICITATION OF OPINIONS) (1988),
available at http://sunzi.lib.hku.hk/bldho/BLOO84.pdf Once the five-month public
consultation period ended, the Basic Law Consultative Committee had received
approximately 74,000 submissions. Ming K. Chan, Democracy Derailed:
Realpolitik in the Making of the Hong Kong Basic Law, 1985-90, in THE HONG
KONG BASIC LAW: BLUEPRINT FOR "STABILITY AND PROSPERITY" UNDER CHINESE
SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 46, at 4 (citing BASIC LAW CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE,
OFFICIAL REPORT: REFERENCE PAPERS FOR THE BASIC LAW OF THE HONG KONG
SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (DRAFT)
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However, a cautionary message can be taken from the 1980s
consultation process, which demonstrated how consensus in Hong
Kong on a particular proposal is no guarantee that it will be accepted
by Beijing.75 There is no guarantee that the outcome would be any
different if a similar consultation exercise were to be conducted in the
near future to try and reach a consensus on the changes that should be
made after June 30, 2047. Joseph Cheng, the Chair Professor of
Political Science at the City University of Hong Kong, warns that such
an exercise could prove "very dangerous," as China could use it as an
excuse to implement changes to other aspects of Hong Kong's
existing way of life with which it is uncomfortable.76 To take just one
important example, the power of final adjudication currently granted
to the Hong Kong courts could prove particularly vulnerable to
abolition, because it is rare in autonomous areas elsewhere in the
world,77 and it has resulted in a number of court rulings with which
China strongly disagrees. 8
Under a purposive interpretation of Article 159(4), China is not
precluded from unilaterally introducing its own amendments to the
Hong Kong Basic Law after June 30, 2047, and it would not have to
wait until a convention to introduce amendments. However, the risk
of China introducing changes after June 30, 2047, will be far greater if
Hong Kong opens up the issue of making changes by putting forth its
own list of proposed amendments.
(Feb. 1989)); MING K. CHAN, PREcARIOus BALANCE: HONG KONG BETWEEN CHINA
AND BRITAIN, 1842-1992 207 (1997).
75. For an example of how consensus in Hong Kong regarding a particular
issue does not guarantee Beijing's approval, see MARK ROBERTI, THE FALL OF
HONG KONG 268-75 (1996). See also Ming K. Chan, supra note 74, at 15
(discussing China's refusal to even consider a proposal known as the Omelco
Consensus, which enjoyed widespread support in Hong Kong, and would have seen
all members of Hong Kong's legislature popularly elected by 2003).
76. See Backchat, supra note 37, at 38:40-39:40.
77. HERZER, supra note 18, at 12.
78. For example, the Court of Final Appeal's ruling in the Director of
Immigration v. Chong Fung Yuen, (2001) 4 H.K.C.F.A.R. 211 prompted a public
expression of "deep concern" from Chinese authorities. HK Government: Abode
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Indeed, if, as Deng Xiaoping's public statements suggest, China
has no intention of making major changes in Hong Kong after June
30, 2047, it may prove reluctant to consider making even the more
minor amendments to Article 5 of the Hong Kong Basic Law that
many consider necessary to remove any uncertainty about the
continued existence of the "one country, two systems" beyond that
date. Since 1997, whenever the issue of amending the Hong Kong
Basic Law has arisen, China has always proved reluctant to
contemplate such a step." There is no guarantee that this reluctance
would necessarily disappear in the run-up to June 30, 2047. Chen
suggests that China might instead prefer to remove any uncertainty
about Hong Kong's future after that date by issuing a separate
Decision of the National People's Congress on this point.80 In China,
such decisions serve as a supplement to the original law.81
While "one country, two systems" can continue to exist after June
30, 2047, under the Hong Kong Basic Law, fundamental changes to
how that policy is applied in practise will become possible which are
not, at least in theory, permissible before that date. As mentioned
previously, the only legal protection against fundamental changes
prior to June 30, 2047, is the provision in Article 159(4), which seeks
to entrench large parts of the Hong Kong Basic Law against
fundamental change for the first fifty years after 1997. But, the Hong
Kong Basic Law is a law enacted by the National People's Congress
(or NPC), a sovereign legislature under China's constitution. 82 Just as
79. China demonstrated its reluctance to contemplate an amendment after the
Court of Final Appeal interpreted Article 22(4) and 24(2)(3) of the Hong Kong
Basic Law in a way which might have potentially permitted more than one million
China-born children with a Hong Kong parent to exercise permanent residency
rights in Hong Kong. Ng Ka Ling and Others v. Director of Immigration (1999) 2
H.K.C.F.A.R. 4 (C.F.A.). Instead of amending the Hong Kong Basic Law, the
Standing Committee of the National People's Congress sought a fresh interpretation
of these provisions. See Yash Ghai, The NPC Interpretation and Its Consequences,
in HONG KONG'S CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATE: CONFLICT OVER INTERPRETATION,
supra note 79, at 199-215.
80. Backchat, supra note 37, at 20:20-20:50.
81. See ALBERT H. Y. CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 110 (3d ed. 2004).
82. HONG KONG BASIC LAW, supra note 1, pmbl., para. 3 ("the National
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the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty has traditionally meant there
are no legal limits on the power of the British parliament to amend or
repeal any law,83 Chen argues that, in China, a doctrine of
Congressional supremacy means that the National People's
Congress's power "to make or unmake any law whatsoever on any
matter whatsoever" is unlimited. 84
While any new law that attempts to implement fundamental
changes in Hong Kong prior to June 30, 2047, would undoubtedly be
politically controversial,8 ' it would not necessarily be unlawful.
Instead, as a sovereign legislature, the NPC would simply be
exercising its lawful power to repeal the contrary provision contained
in Article 159(4), which purports to prevent such changes. As Ling
notes, the attempt to protect large parts of the Hong Kong Basic Law
against fundamental change for the first fifty years after 1997, is "not
legally binding on a future NPC."86
This is not the only way which changes could be implemented
prior to June 30, 2047, should China wish to do so. Under Article
People's Congress hereby enacts the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China, prescribing the systems to
be practised in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, in order to ensure the
implementation of the basic policies of the People's Republic of China regarding
Hong Kong."); CHINA CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, arts. 2, 57 (1982).
83. See the classic statement on the absolute sovereignty of the U.K.
Parliament, originally put forward by the famous 19th century jurist A.V. Dicey,
restated in STANLEY DE SMITH & RODNEY BRAZIER, CONSTITUTIONAL AND
ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 67 (8th ed., 1998).
84. Albert H.Y. Chen, The Court of Final Appeal's Ruling in the 'Illegal
Migrant' Children Case: Congressional Supremacy and Judicial Review, in HONG
KONG'S CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATE: CONFLICT OVER INTERPRETATION, supra note
79, at 80.
85. It would also be a breach of China's international treaty obligations under
Article 3(12) of the Joint Declaration, which states that the basic policies
implementing "one country, two systems" will remain unchanged for fifty years
after June 30, 1997.
86. Bing Ling, The Proper Law for the Conflict between the Basic Law and
Other Legislative Acts of the National People's Congress, in HONG KONG'S
CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATE: CONFLICT OVER INTERPRETATION, supra note 79, at 151,
163. Professor Ling is a Professor in the Faculty of Law at the Chinese University
of Hong Kong.
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158(1), the Standing Committee of the NPC, the smaller permanent
arm of China's legislature, also has the power to issue binding
interpretations of the Hong Kong Basic Law. 87 Since 1997, the
Standing Committee has used this power to issue interpretations that
have: (1) reversed the effects of a court judgment;88 (2) given Beijing
the power to determine changes to the system for electing Hong
Kong's legislature; 89 and (3) rewritten the literal meaning of another
provision in the Hong Kong Basic Law.90 In Lau Kong Yung v.
Director of Immigration, Hong Kong's highest court affirmed the
"unqualified" nature of this power.9 1 Unlike the power of amendment,
exercised by the full NPC under Article 159, the Standing
87. This power is part of a general principle under the Chinese legal system
under which the power of interpretation is primarily vested with a representative of
the body that originally enacted the law, rather than the courts. See PETER HOWARD
CORNE, FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN CHINA: THE ADMINISTRATIVE LEGAL SYSTEM 135-
45 (1997).
88. On June 26, 1999, the Standing Committee issued its interpretation of
certain parts of the Hong Kong Basic Law and reversed the effect of large parts of
the Ng Ka Ling judgment. See supra note 79 and accompanying text; Interpretation
of Articles 22(4) and 24(2)(3) of the Basic Law (adopted by the Standing Comm.
Nat'l People's Cong., June 26, 1999) (1999).
89. Interpretation of Clause 7 of Annex I and Clause 3 of Annex 2 of the
Basic Law (adopted by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Apr. 6, 2004).
The interpretation established that any amendments to Annex I or Annex II of the
Basic Law would require the National People's Congress Standing Committee's
approval as a prerequisite. Mark R. Conrad, Interpreting Hong Kong 's Basic Law:
A Case for Cases, 23 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 1, 2 (2005).
90. Interpretation of Paragraph 2, Article 53 of the Basic Law (adopted by the
Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Apr. 27, 2005). This interpretation held
that, where, prior to 2007, a Chief Executive did not complete his full, five-year
term of office, the new Chief Executive should only serve the remaining portion of
that five-year period. This runs counter to the literal meaning of Article 46 of the
Hong Kong Basic Law, which stipulates a five-year term of office for all Chief
Executives.
91. Lau Kong Yung v. Director of Immigration (1999) 2 H.K.C.F.A.R. 300,
323. For criticism of this decision, see Danny Gittings, Hong Kong's Courts are
Learning to Live with China, HONG KONG J. 1, 6 (July 2010),
http://www.hkjournal.org/PDF/2010fall/2.pdf.
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Committee's power of interpretation is not subject to any substantive
or major procedural constraints. 92
As such, should China ever decide to introduce fundamental
changes to the way "one country, two systems" is implemented in
Hong Kong, a fresh interpretation by the Standing Committee of the
relevant provisions in the Hong Kong Basic Law would provide a
quick and lawful means of doing so, even prior to June 30, 2047. That
is not to suggest this is likely to happen anytime soon. Since 1997, the
Standing Committee has interpreted the Hong Kong Basic Law on
only four occasions, 93 suggesting it is a power that is exercised
sparingly. But, it does reinforce the fact that if fundamental change
does come to Hong Kong at some point in future, it need not
necessarily be in 2047, thereby undermining the importance of June
30, 2047.
V. CONCLUSION
While the importance of June 30, 2047, to Hong Kong's future
should not be dismissed, it should not be exaggerated. As shown,
radical change is far from inevitable immediately after that date, and
change is not necessarily the most likely scenario. Much will most
likely depend on decisions that have yet to be made by future
generations of Chinese leaders in coming decades, balancing the
advantages and disadvantages of maintaining or changing Hong
Kong's present system.
A historical parallel is instructive. Prior to July 1, 1997, there
were many apocalyptic forecasts of the radical changes that were
expected to occur in Hong Kong immediately after China's
resumption of sovereignty. 94  Ultimately, these changes failed to
92. Article 158(4) contains the only constraint. Pursuant to this section, the
Standing Committee is required to consult the Committee for the Basic Law prior to
issuing an interpretation. See supra text accompanying note 36.
93. STANDING COMM. NAT'L PEOPLE'S CONG., INTERPRETATION OF
PARAGRAPH 1, ARTICLE 13 AND ARTICLE 19 OF THE BASIC LAW (Aug. 26, 2011); see
also supra text accompanying notes 88-90.
94. See, e.g., Louis Kraar & Joe McGowan, The Death of Hong Kong,
FORTUNE (June 26, 1995), http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune
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materialise, and July 1, 1997, saw a high degree of continuity,
especially in Hong Kong's legal system. 95 Instead, change has been a
more gradual process, beginning long before 1997 and continuing
through to today. 96 Although it is far too early to be certain, there is
no reason necessarily to expect 2047 to be any different.
archive/1995/06/26/203948/index.htm. Kraar and McGowan's cover story is one of
the most famous examples, and the same magazine subsequently retracted it.
Sheridan Prasso, Oops! Hong Kong is Hardly Dead, FORTUNE (June 28, 2007),
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortunearchive/2007/07/09/100122332/
index.htm.
95. Under the provisions of the Hong Kong Basic Law, most aspects of the
legal and judicial system were unaffected by the transfer of sovereignty to China.
The main exception was the creation of a Court of Final Appeal under Article 82 of
the Hong Kong Basic Law. Pursuant to Article 82, the Court of Final Appeal
assumed the power of final adjudication, a power that the Judicial Committee of the
Privy Council in London previously exercised. HONG KONG BASIC LAW, supra note
1, arts. 8, 81(2), 82, 86, 87, 91, 93(1), 160; Albert H.Y. Chen, Constitutional
Adjudication in Post-1997 Hong Kong, 15 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 627, 634 (2006).
96. See Danny Gittings, Changing Expectations: How the Rule of Law Fared
in the First Decade of the Hong Kong SAR, H.K. J. 1, 3-4 (2007),
http://www.hkjournal.org/pdf/2007_fall/2.pdf.
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